APPENDIX A

15 USCA›

§1. TRUSTS, ETC., IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE ILLEGAL; EXCEPTION OF RESALE PRICE AGREEMENTS; PENALTY

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: *Provided*, That nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition under section 45 of this title: *Provided further*, That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on con-

viction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. July 2, 1890, c. 647, §1, 26 Stat. 209; Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693, July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282.

§2. MONOPOLIZING TRADE A MISDEMEANOR; PENALTY

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. July 2, 1890, c. 647, §2, 26 Stat. 209; July 7, 1955, c. 281, 69 Stat. 282.

§15. SUITS BY PERSONS INJURED; AMOUNT OF RECOVERY

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, §4, 38 Stat. 731.

§17. ANTITRUST LAWS NOT APPLICABLE TO LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-

tion of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, §6, 38 Stat. 731.

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29 USCA Sec. 52 (Sec. 20 of the Clayton Act):

§52: STATUTORY RESTRICTION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.

And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating infor-

mation, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States. Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738.

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29 USCA Sec. 102 (Sec. 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act):

§102: PUBLIC POLICY IN LABOR MATTERS DECLARED

In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are defined and limited in this chapter, the public policy of the United States is declared as follows:

Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing,

to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted. Mar. 23, 1932, c. 90, §2, 47 Stat. 70.

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29 USCA Sec. 104 (Sec. 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act):

§104: ENUMERATION OF SPECIFIC ACTS NOT SUBJECT TO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR INJUNCTIONS

No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:

(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;

(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of this title;

(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of value;

(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;

(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence;

(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute;

(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified;

(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and

(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of this title. Mar. 23, 1932, c. 90, §4, 47 Stat. 70.

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29 USCA Sec. 106 (Sec. 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act):

§106: RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF ASSOCIATIONS OR THEIR ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS, MEMBERS, AND AGENTS

No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization

of, such acts or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. Mar. 23, 1932, c. 90 §6, 47 Stat. 71.

. . .

Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; . . . Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses . . .

APPENDIX B

Excerpts from

Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959

(Government Printing Office, 1959), Volume II.

Representative Rhodes of Pennsylvania:

pp. 1641-42:

. . . .

"No longer was there regard for the economic problems of individual business firms or the impact of demands upon any local industry or area affected."

. . .

"No longer was wage bargaining a matter for elected local union leadership. Now, professional labor leaders at the national or international level did the dickering, setting wage patterns for whole industries . . ."

. . .

"Chief victims of labor monopoly power remain the consumer and the small businessman."

. . .

Representative Alger of Texas:

p. 1508:

. . . .

"The consequent denial to unions of the right to fix prices . . . would not in any way interfere . . . with their proper collective bargaining powers. They would merely be placed on an equal footing with all other groups in society as was the case during the fifty years prior to the Hutcheson decision."

. . .

p. 1690:

"The unions should be put under the antitrust laws so that business and labor will both operate under the same ground rules."

. . .

"Monopolistic practice of industrywide and pattern bargaining by professional labor bosses at the national or international level would be ended."

. . .

Representative Hoffman of Michigan:

p. 1717:

. . .

"When we were writing the Taft-Hartley law, . . . we had in it a provision designed to prevent nationwide, industry-wide bargaining."

. . .

"There would appear to be no sound reason why those provisions making anti-monopoly laws applicable legislation to unions should not now be in this bill."

. . .

Representative Heistand of California:

p. 1748:

. . .

"Prevent centralized control of collective bargaining policies by national or international unions, and return these functions to the local union level."

. . .

". . . big power combinations of unions would be broken up, just as the big corporation trusts of the 1890's were broken up by the Sherman Act."

. . .

Representative Flynn of Wisconsin:

p. 1837:

. . .

". . . As we get big unionism to match big business, we will indeed have a new type of economy . . . is this for the best interests of America and the people of America?"

. . .

Senator Morse of Oregon:

p. 1190:

. . .

"Labor law in America reflects increasing awareness that no sound economic theory permits free market thinking to be applied to wages and working conditions, as it is to prices. In the absence of collective bargaining the wage market is a fiction for wages and working conditions are established unilaterally by the employer. Competition among workers against each other for jobs produces not fair wages, but sweatshops; not increased productivity, but depressions. Society should not, under the guise of preserving freedom to compete, force them to bear the competitive burden which an entrepreneur in hope of profit, voluntarily assumes. In modern industrial society, meaningful economic freedom for the vast majority of employees can be attained not through individual, but from collective action.

"This was the reasoning behind Congress' declaration in 1914 in the Clayton Act that 'the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce' and that labor unions shall not 'be held or construed to be illegal combinations in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.' That declaration reflected recognition that 'to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate the competition from nonunion made goods,' and that

elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization. Once the purpose of employee combination was thus recognized, sanction of the conventional tactics of organized labor in its effort to improve its material conditions followed inevitably. These tactics, peaceful primary picketing are the only civilized means through which organized workers can safeguard their own wages and working conditions against the competition of unorganized workers; the only way—short of governmental wage fixing—through which price competition based on differences in labor costs can be eliminated. To deprive organized workers of these means of competing with unorganized workers dooms their objective to defeat.

"Once we recognize that establishment of uniform wages and hours through collective bargaining as desirable, common sense should accept peaceful tactics by which unions traditionally seek in their own self-interest, to enlist nonmembers. Those who choose to work as nonunionists, by that very choice, tend to defeat and undermine the economic interests of union members in maintaining good wages and working conditions for themselves. In defense of their own economic position and in the fact of varying shades of employer hostility, union members should accordingly be free to utilize such economic power as they possess to persuade employees of the value of their cause."

. . .

Representative Oliver of Maine:

p. 1809:

. . .

"As I see the picture, Mr. Speaker, the adoption of this Landrum-Griffin conference report leads in only one

direction. It is just one more step toward more restrictive labor legislation. The U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Manufacturers Association, speaking and acting for big business with their appetites for further labor control whetted by this victory, will press for the ultimate victory; namely, a national so-called right-to-work law and then, the antitrust stranglehold for which they are really aiming. Many of them have already so stated. The program of big business in America is not only to control financially and economically, but also politically . . ."

• • •

"The Landrum-Griffin conference report will not only slow down further the growth and strength of the trade-union movement, but it will eventually lead to the more repressive developments to which I have referred; namely, the so-called right-to-work laws on a national scale and then, the crowning blow, the antitrust knock-out punch. This will mean the breakdown of American democracy.

"As long as I am a Member of this House, Mr. Speaker, my vote will never be recorded for legislation which makes illegal the economic weapons which the working men and women need, to fight for and get their fair share of the production of this great productive plant which is known as industrial America.

"Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to and shall vote against this Landrum-Griffith conference report."

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